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1. Introduction 
While possibilities to overcome the global financial and economic crisis and to mitigate its 
negative impacts are dominating the political and scientific agendas, there are also voices 
that stress that we are actually facing a “double crisis” and that “dangerous climate change 
poses a permanent and far more serious threat to human development and prosperity” 
(Edenhofer & Stern 2009). Heat weaves like those in Europe in 2003 and hurricanes like 
hurricane Katrina that destroyed New Orleans in 2007 give us first impressions of what the 
effects of rising global temperatures could result in. The IPCC report from 2007 has stressed 
again the necessity for global emissions to peak within the next few years and for emission 
reductions of 50 per cent relative to today by mid-century in order to stay within manageable 
temperature increases. As a result of the economic crisis and decreasing industrial produc-
tion global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are projected to decline by 2 to 5 per cent. Yet, 
to reach the 50-per-cent-target that has also been acknowledged by the G8-Summit in 
Heiligendamm in 2007 and was on the table at the recent G20 summit in London in April 
2009, global emissions need to decrease by around 1.5  per cent annually for the next 
40 years. A few years of reduced emission growth will thus only contribute little to solving the 
global climate problem if we return to business as usual after the crisis. Whether or not the 
impacts of climate change soon supersede the financial crisis with respect to its economic 
and social dimension will depend crucially on whether the 50 per cent reduction of global 
GHG emissions until 2050 will be successful. This implies that the current emission reduc-
tions caused by the economic recession need to be put on a permanent basis – however, 
without the huge macro-economic costs of the economic crisis.  
There is some hope that the current crisis gives us the possibility to rethink our current eco-
nomic system, the global imbalances and, not less relevant, its dependency on fossil fuels. 
The eventual challenge is the necessary initiation of structural changes to reach an economic 
and environmental sustainable growth path after the crisis. Inspired by the “New Deal” of US 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt that was an answer to the great depression of the 1930s the 
UN envisages the economy to react to the current global crisis with a “Global Green New 
Deal” (cf. UNEP 2009). One chance for a “green global recovery” (Edenhofer & Stern 2009) 
lies in the large economic stimulus packages that have been passed in the major economies.  
Worldwide, approximately $  2.7  trillion have been earmarked by governments for these 
packages aimed at remedying the global economic downturn. This sum, which amounts to 
4.7 per cent of world income, is intended primarily to stop the downward spiral of cancelled 
investment plans and cuts in production and employment, as well the shrinking income and 
demand caused by such cancellations and cuts. In addition, it is also explicitly intended to 
put the world economy on a new and sustainable growth path. The sizes and the nature of 
the stimulus packages vary considerably from country to country. Figure  1 shows that in 
absolute monetary terms, China and the United States have the largest stimulus packages.   Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  2 / 15 
Stimulus packages in the EU member states amount to only 15 per cent of the packages 
worldwide. In relative economic terms also, the EU member states spend only 1.6 per cent of 
EU GDP on stimulus packages, whereas the United States are spending approximately 7 per 
cent and China is spending approximately 14 per cent. The United States and China are, 
however, also the largest emitters of CO2. Consequently, especially the “green” focus of their 











Figure 1: World Wide Stimulus Packages 
Altogether, the stimulus packages provide opportunities to invest heavily in emission-saving 
measures and structural adjustments, and to initiate climate friendly growth. The question is 
whether these opportunities are actually taken advantage of, to what extent the funds are 
likely to be used for green measures and how many GHG savings these imply. In their 
“Green New Deal Proposal” the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimated 
that $ 750 billion or roughly a quarter of the worldwide stimulus packages are necessary to 
reach a “green” growth path (UNEP 2009). In Section 2 we will assess whether the major 
stimulus packages can reach this tentative target, give an overview about the planned green 
measures and evaluate their contribution to economic and ecological sustainable growth.  
Beside this positive impact of the economic crisis on climate change mitigation there is also 
the danger that lobbying against climate policies especially from energy producers as well as 
energy-intensive industries has higher chances of being successful in times of recession. 
Assumably, the economic crisis will be used as an excuse to postpone stringent climate 
policy measures which are costly in the short term. Australia, for example has already 
announced that it will delay its anticipated Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) by 
one year explicitly mentioning the global economic crisis as the reason. Section 3 addresses 
the question whether there is major evidence that the global financial and economic crisis 
effects national climate protection legislation.    Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  3 / 15 
In the worst case the attitude that there are currently other priorities and neither scope nor 
funds for climate protection will also negatively influence the ongoing negotiations of a follow-
up treaty of the Kyoto Protocol that expires in 2012. The main issue in this context is the in-
clusion of major developing and emerging countries, which are estimated to contribute more 
than 50 per cent to overall annual global GHG emissions by 2030, into a Post-Kyoto treaty. 
These countries argue with some justification that the developed countries are responsible 
for almost 80 per cent of anthropogenic GHG emissions since the industrial revolution and 
have much higher per capita emissions than the developing countries. Hence, they argue 
that the developed countries should carry most of the reduction costs. There are different 
possibilities for burden sharing including the allocation of emission rights in an international 
emission trading system or direct transfers. One option that is currently discussed is an 
adaptation fund to which mainly developed countries could contribute. This fund could be 
used to alleviate the adverse effects of global warming which will mostly occur in developing 
countries. Finding an agreement on a global level at the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in December in Copenhagen, Denmark has thus become more difficult. The 
prospects for the Post-Kyoto negotiations in the light of the current global financial and eco-
nomic crisis are addressed in more detail in Section 4.  
Altogether, the aim of this paper is to summarize the main positive and negative effects of 
the global crisis for reaching global emission reductions. Will the world use the opportunity to 
initiate necessary structural adjustment in the current way of producing and consuming 
energy, or will there be “no money left for climate protection?” We hope that this paper 
contributes to making the right choices.  
2.  A Climate of Recovery? 
As mentioned above, worldwide, roughly $ 2.7 trillion or 4.7 per cent of world income have 
been allocated by governments for stimulus packages aimed at remedying the global eco-
nomic downturn. Part of the money is also intended to put the world economy on a new and 
sustainable growth path. According to the UNEP roughly $ 750 billion or 25 per cent of the 
world wide stimulus packages should be invested in so called “green” investments to achieve 
long-term, sustainable economic growth (UNEP 2009) and to initiate a “Global Green New 
Deal”. These “green” investments include in particular investments for improving the insula-
tion of public and private buildings, for extending the usage of renewable energies, for 
improving non-polluting transport, and for generating sustainable agriculture and water 
management.  
All these different measures have of course different impacts on the environment, and are 
also differently suitable to promote economic growth and employment sufficiently fast. While 
measures including large investment in the construction sector can possibly yield a high 
multiplier and also be sustainable from an ecological point of view, they may also take a long 
time to be approved. On the other hand, direct transfer payments like scrappage bonuses   Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  4 / 15 
may be implemented fast, but have limited effects on growth and ambiguous environmental 
impacts. Measures that are considered well suited both from an economic and ecological 
perspective and are implementable within a short time span are improvements in grid 
managements (e.g. “smart grids”), speeding-up of already planned investments in railroad 
and other public transportation systems and investments in building insulation.
1 Apart from 
measures that promote climate protection, stimulus packages may also include possibly 
harmful measures, e.g. expanded road construction. Generally, a proper mix of measures is 
preferable towards the concentration on individual measures, since capacities are limited, 
private investments may be crowded-out and the economic and ecological impact of each 
individual measure is subject to considerable uncertainty. 
In practice, the stimulus packages vary considerably from country to country regarding rela-
tive and absolute size and composition (cf. again Figure  1). These differences can be 
explained to some extent by different forecasted economic development in the downturn and 
fiscal potential to stimulate their economies. As the various countries vary by their initial eco-
nomic situation at the beginning of the downturn, so do they in their efforts to mitigate 
climatic change so far. In particular the “green” shares of the United States and China matter 
with respect to the sustainability of the new growth path, because these two countries are the 
largest emitters of CO2 in absolute terms and both showed limited willingness to mitigate 
climate change in the past. Whereas the European Union (EU) already established an emis-
sion trading scheme in 2005 that constantly reduced the assigned allowances to the com-
panies, the United States just recently seem to be increasingly willing to mitigate climate 
change.  
Table 1 presents the “green” share of the worldwide stimulus packages. It shows that 13 per 
cent of the stimulus packages will be used directly or indirectly for climate protection pur-
poses and approximately another 2.5 per cent will be used for other types of environmental 
protection. This will save an estimated 111 million tonnes of CO2 annually.
2 Yet, this amount 
is less than 0.5 per cent of the actual annual world emissions. Furthermore, even though a 
significant share of the worldwide stimulus packages is spent for climate protection, the pro-
posed 25 per cent share of the “Global Green New Deal” is missed.  
                                                  
1  Own appraisal based on Houser et al. 2009. See Klepper et al. 2009 for details. 
2  Estimation based on Houser et al. 2009. See Klepper et al. 2009 for details.   Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  5 / 15 
Table 1: Green Shares of the Stimulus Packages Worldwide 












    in billion USD  In %  In %  in Mio. t CO2
a 
America   1019.2  9.8  1.5  46.9 
 United  States  972.0  9.9  1.6  45.7 
 Rest  47.2  6.9  0.3 1.2 
Pacific Asia    1286.5  15.7  4.2  41.6 
 China  586.1  29.0  5.2  24.8 
 Japan  485.9  2.6  0.0 7.8 
 Rest  214.5  9.0  10.9 9,0 
Europe   382.1  13.0  0.3  22.4 
Africa   7.5  9.5  0.0  0.1 
Sum   2695.3  13.4  2.63  111.0 
aThe annual emissions savings were calculated by allocating the measures within the green share to the 
measures of the study by the World Resource Institute and by multiplying the annual emission saving potential 
with the actual volume. 
Sources: Robins et al. (2009), Houser et al. (2009) and own calculations.  
Of the countries listed only China surpasses the required share, spending 29 per cent on 
climate change mitigation projects and 5 per cent on other environmental friendly projects. 
This relative large “green” share has to be considered together with the resulting annual CO2 
emission reductions, though. China invests roughly $  170  billion in climate protection, 
achieving estimated annual emission reductions of 25 million tonnes of CO2. This seems 
rather low at the first glance, e.g. compared to the United States, which invest roughly 
$ 67 billion in climate change mitigation projects, but achieve annual emission reductions of 
46 million tonnes CO2. Taking into account the high CO2 abatement potential in China due to 
its low energy efficiency, the reversed effect would have been expected. However, these 
estimations do not take into account lots of China’s peculiarities and are thus immensely 
uncertain. Nevertheless, most of the “green” share in the Chinese stimulus package is spent 
on improving and expanding the railroad networks and electrical grids. In this context, it is to 
be expected that this measure will increase capacities rather than efficiency, thus causing 
emissions to rise rather than fall. Also secondary effects like a possible increase in the burn-
ing of coal for electricity generation caused by eased transportation restrictions have to be 
taken into account. This example shows that the savings could be higher, but that many of 
the stimulus programmes have considerable potential to save more. 
The stimulus packages in the EU are expected to save 22 million tonnes of CO2 annually, 
which amounts to approximately 2.5  per cent of the EU’s reduction target for 2020. The 
reduction in current emissions is expected to amount to about 0.44 per cent, which is about 
the same reduction that stimulus packages elsewhere will bring about. Almost half of the   Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  6 / 15 
reductions in the EU (9.5  million tonnes) are expected to be brought about by the EU 
Commission’s stimulus packages. Another 35 per cent of the reductions (7.6 million tonnes) 
are expected to be brought about by the German stimulus packages.  
The expected emission reductions are, however, subject to a great deal of uncertainty. In 
many cases, the stimulus packages have not been defined very well yet. Even more, there is 
often also a certain share of climate-harming measures in the stimulus packages, e.g. energy 
vouchers, increased spending on road construction or suspension of tolls. Consequently, it is 
difficult to estimate the effect the stimulus packages will have on energy use and emissions. 
Additionally, the estimated range of the “green” shares in the stimulus packages varies con-
siderably depending on the final design. Figure 2 shows the variations and possible range of 
the most important stimulus packages in the EU. 













Figure 2: Potential green share of the stimulus packages in Europe  
Due to the large estimated range of the “green” share in the stimulus packages, there is still 
the opportunity to make them “greener.” The measures financed by the stimulus packages 
are still in the process of being formulated in detail. Thus it would be possible to increase the 
“green component” of the packages in the EU that have already been approved to 35 per 
cent. If all of the stimulus packages in Germany were to be designed to be “green”, 32 per 
cent of the appropriated funds could be used for climate protection purposes this year. If, on 
the other hand, climate protection was not to be given priority, the amount available for 
climate protection purposes could fall to 5 per cent. These figures show the great extent of 
uncertainty in the evaluation of the stimulus packages’ impacts. However, what is certain is 
that stimulus packages alone, however good they might be designed, are not the “magic 
silver bullet” that cures the world from the multiple threats of climate change and economic 
downturn. In the medium and long run, only a significant change of the world economy’s 
structure, induced by severe GHG-mitigation and adaptation efforts, will prevent the climate 
crises.    Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  7 / 15 
3.  No Power Left for Climate Protection?  
After the previous section analysed the environmental impacts of the national stimulus pack-
ages, we now take a broader look at current national and transnational climate protection 
legislation in the face of the global financial and economic crisis.  
One example where the global financial and economic crisis is explicitly taken as an excuse 
to postpone climate policies is Australia. With a reference to the global recession, the instal-
lation of a market-based cap-and-trade programme was postponed for 12 months in May 
2009 (cf. Reklev 2009a) and the carbon pollution permit cost was fixed to A$ 10 in the first 
year (from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012). In August, the Senate voted against the carbon 
trading bill but the government may submit a revised form of the bill to parliament later in the 
year (cf. McGarrity 2009a). Finally, energy-intensive industries benefit from a global reces-
sion assistant package so that altogether there are now several breaks for these industries. 
Yet, there are also positive signs and the Australian government, led by centre-left Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd, announced on May, 18
th 2009 that it planned to build the world’s largest 
solar energy plant with an output of 1000 megawatts at the cost of A$ 1.4 billion as part of a 
A$ 4.65 billion clean energy initiative (cf. Fox 2009) and the parliament voted in August in 
favour of a 20 percent target for electricity from renewable sources by 2020 (cf. McGarrity 
2009a). Altogether the current Rudd Administration still seems to be more determined to 
achieve a meaningful post-Kyoto document at the Climate Change Conference in Copen-
hagen compared to the former Howard Administration that did not agree to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol (cf. Aldy and Stavins 2007, p. 10) and refused to install an emission trading scheme 
in 2007, even when the Australia’s states voted to cut carbon dioxide emissions and fight 
global warming. 
In other countries the effects of the global financial and economic crisis on climate policy are 
less explicit. In the United States, the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide per capita, the 
2008 US-American presidential elections of Barack Obama were possibly a cornerstone in 
the global fight against climate change. In his campaign Obama promised to turn around the 
lax environmental policy of his predecessor, former US President George W. Bush who, like 
Australian former Prime Minister Howard, did not agree to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (cf. Aldy 
and Stavins 2007, p. 10). Today though, after the outbreak of the crisis and updated pros-
pects of a global recession, the outcome of a firm and determined environmental policy, 
including an effective and efficient emission trading scheme, is uncertain. President Obama’s 
proposed plan to fully auction the permits of the future cap-and-trade scheme (cf. Zabarenko 
2009) is opposed by Republican representatives and seems to get watered down by Democ-
rats who represent heavily affected states. Representatives amended the hundred per cent 
auctioning clause in the Waxman-Markey bill and it was also included to give away permits to 
energy-intensive industries for free. The overall target of a 20 per cent emission reduction 
relative to 2005 was reduced to 17 per cent and means almost no reductions relative to 1990 
(cf. Carroll 2009). Still, the Obama Administration seems to have generally convinced Con-
gress of the importance of stricter environmental policy. Likewise, President Obama prom-  Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  8 / 15 
ised more cooperation in international negotiations for a post-Kyoto climate change treaty, 
which is essential for a successful outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations as a whole due 
to the leadership role of the United States and its position as largest per capita contributor to 
climate change.  
In the EU the so-called “climate package” that defines rather ambitious climate polices is 
under discussion already since 2007/2008. It includes a reduction of GHG emissions of at 
least 20 per cent (relative to 1990) until the year 2020 that is increased to 30 per cent if other 
developed countries undertake comparable reduction efforts. Furthermore, the EU’s climate 
package includes a 20 per cent share of renewable energies in the EU’s energy consumption 
by 2020, a 10 per cent minimum target for the market share of renewable transport fuels and 
improved rules for the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The aim is in particular 
to decrease the number of emission allowances and to make the carbon dioxide emission 
market more competitive. The global financial and economic crisis has fortunately not 
delayed the legislation and the climate package was ultimately adopted by the European 
Council in April 2009 (European Union, 2009a and 2009b) and entered intro force in June 
2009. Yet, the final adopted text contains some concessions for European industries and it is 
not unlikely that the success of industry lobbying was influenced by the global recession. The 
main concession was the reduced auctioning of allowance where the European Council as 
well as a majority of parties in the European Parliament did not follow the Commissions 
proposal for full auctioning. Moreover, coal industry lobbying achieved that coal-fired power 
plants do not need to obey maximum carbon dioxide emission standards (cf. EurActiv 
2009a). This policy is particularly favourable to Eastern European member states like Poland 
which produces 90 per cent of its electricity by coal-fired power plants and leaves space for 
the construction of high emitting coal-fired power plants in the future (cf. EurActiv 2009a). 
Evidence of impacts of the global recession on climate policy in other countries and regions 
is even more speculative. Japan decided in June 2009 to reduce its emissions by 8 per cent 
compared to 1990 levels by 2020 (cf. Tabuchi, Hiroko et al. 2009) which is only slightly more 
than the 6 per cent reduction by 2012 of the Kyoto Protocol. The same is true for Russia that 
also declared a new “goal” on climate protection in June 2009 and aims at a 10 to 15 per 
cent reduction after 2012 compared to 1990 levels (cf. McGarrity 2009b). Since in 2007 
Russia in fact emitted 34  per cent less compared to 1990 levels this so-called climate 
protection “goal” is simply meant to state that Russia regards the development of further 
energy-intensive industries and power plants as its historical right, since the collapse of the 
former Soviet industries was the main reason for the great reduction after 1990. Russia’s 
weak “goals” by themselves probably did not change due to the global financial and 
economic crisis, yet it is assumable that the crisis and the little leeway for investment 
reinforced Russia’s determination not to share the costs of climate protection. 
China, which is meanwhile the greatest emitter of CO2 in absolute terms, has generally 
recognised the importance of emission reductions and demonstrates willingness to control 
GHG emissions and to invest in more environmental-friendly technology. Partly this willing-  Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  9 / 15 
ness is driven by the clear signs of environmental degradation in Chinese cities and the agri-
cultural sector, and by the fear of social unrest against the regime’s current environmental 
policy. A main reason is also China’s position in the global race for green technology produc-
tion. Policies include a subsidy for solar capacity installed in 2009 by $ 3 per watt, subsidies 
for the infant Chinese electric car industry, and cooperation on green technology with US-
American and European companies. The Chinese government moreover aims to increase 
the share of renewable energy from 16 per cent today to 23 per cent in 2020 (cf. Aston 
2009). A good sign is also that in April 2009 the Chinese government considered for the first 
time to set a reduction target for GHG emissions (CO2-Handel, 2009a).  
Positive news in terms of national climate policies include the legislations in Mexico and 
South Korea. In June 2009 Mexican President Felipe Calderon announced that Mexico aims 
at a 50 per cent reduction of carbon dioxide in 2050 compared to 2000 levels (cf. Volcovici 
2009a). To begin such an ambitious path, Mexico aims at an 8 to 16 per cent reduction of 
carbon dioxide until 2012 and increases its investment in restoring deforested land. Mean-
while South Korea which is part of the Four Asian Tigers, member of the G20 and thus can 
be considered a young developed country plans to pass legislation for a national ETS soon 
(cf. Reklev 2009b). The planned bill would also include the investment of billions of Euros in 
energy efficiency over the next ten years. During the last decades South Korea has grown to 
be one of the ten largest emitters of GHGs on the planet. Its current legislation is a good 
beginning for future climate negotiations. 
Altogether, even though the direct effects of the global financial and economic crisis on cli-
mate policies are often rather speculative, we thus find at least tendencies to alter or post-
pone climate protection legislation in different important countries and regions, although 
there are also small positive news and although in principle the urgency to combat climate 
change remains acknowledged everywhere.  
4.  Prospects for the post-Kyoto Negotiations  
Even more important than the effect of the global financial and economic crisis on national 
climate policies is the question whether the crisis will have an impact on the international 
climate regime negotiations. As was mentioned already in the introduction it is necessary for 
global emissions to peak within in the next few years and an international follow up-
agreement of the Kyoto-Protocol with stringent emissions reductions is urgently needed. The 
decisive negotiations take place in December 2009 in Copenhagen and since it can be 
expected that developed as well as developing countries are far from full recovery from the 
global financial and economic crisis at the end of 2009, this might indeed be a bad timing. 
Generally, the difficulty to agree on an international climate regime is not only due to the 
public goods property of the atmosphere but also due to large international asymmetries. In-
dustrial countries on the one side are responsible for almost 80 per cent of cumulated indus-  Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  10 / 15 
trial GHG emissions up to date and have per capita emissions that are 5 to 200 times larger 
than those in many developing countries. For example, per capita emissions of ca. 20 tCO2 
in the USA and ca. 10 tCO2 in Germany stand in contrast to ca. 4 tCO2 per capita emissions 
in China, ca. 1.2 tCO2 in India and less than 0.1 tCO2 in many African countries. The devel-
oping countries on the other side will suffer most from the adverse effects of climate change. 
Against this background it is comprehensible that representatives from the developing coun-
tries argue that mainly the developed countries should pay for climate policy and reduce their 
high per capita emissions. The developing countries themselves are not willing to endanger 
their development process by strict emission targets. Yet, stringent emission targets can only 
be achieved if the developing countries, that are expected to contribute to more than two 
thirds of GHG emission growth in the next 30 years, also control their emissions. In addition, 
abatement costs are less in these countries. A final important issue is technology. Even if per 
capita emissions are low in developing countries energy is often used very inefficiently. The 
same global production could be produced with only half the GHG emissions if all economies 
would have the same low energy intensity (the amount of energy to produce e.g. a good or 
service worth $ 1) as e.g. Germany. The potential for emission saving technologies and the 
potential for innovation exist mainly in the developing countries. A potential international 
agreement thus needs to have a least three main components: (1)  emission targets, 
(2) mechanisms for and finance of technology transfer and (3) funds for adaptation measures 
in developing countries.  
Concerning emission targets the result of the negotiations in 2007 in Bali that have been 
acknowledged several times envisage global reduction targets of 25 to 40 per cent (relative 
to 1990) by 2020 and reductions of 50 per cent by 2050 (see e.g. Oxfam 2009). The group of 
developing countries (G77, China) demands at least 40 per cent reductions from developed 
countries as they hold historical responsibilities (cf. EurActiv 2009, Oxfam 2009). Represen-
tatives from Small Island States fear that their territories will disappear due to rising sea level 
and demand even 45 per cent reductions. Compared to these targets, the existing national 
targets (as mentioned also in Section 3) are far from ambitious. The EU aims at an overall 20 
or 30 per cent reduction, the US aim at virtually no change compared to 1990, Japan aims at 
8 per cent reductions, Russia aims at 10 to 15 per cent reduction, Australia aims at 2 to 
24  per cent reductions, and Canada aims at a 2  per cent increase (cf. Oxfam 2009, 
McGarrity 2009b).  
The Bali Action Plan also introduces the term of “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
that not only included “measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation 
commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by 
all  developed country Parties”, but also “measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable 
development” (cf. UNFCCC 2007). The EU demands that the developing countries reduce 
their emission by 15 to 30 per cent by 2020 compared to a business as usual path that has 
yet to be defined. This is rejected by the developing countries, even though these reductions 
are physically necessary to reach the overall targets. It is still open, what kind of targets the   Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  11 / 15 
major developing countries including China, India and Brazil are willing to accept. In any 
case this will depend crucially on the other two issues and the willingness of the developed 
countries to provide financial funds for technology transfer, adaptation measures and 
emission reductions.  
In this context Mexico is promoting a plan to create a global climate fund which is financed by 
all countries (except the poorest) based on GDP, population and level of emissions. Repre-
sentatives from developed as well as developing countries already signalled that such a fund 
could be a feasible solution in the negotiations (cf. Volcovici 2009b and Harrison 2009a). Still 
representatives from India, China and other developing countries underline the “common, but 
differentiated responsibilities” of developed and developing countries (cf. Kruppa 2009 and 
EurActiv 2009b) and demand that the developed world pays “the full cost” (cf. Kruppa 2009) 
of adaptation of the developing world. Current budget estimations for a global climate fund 
are about $ 10 billion annually (Volcovici 2009b). This seems to be a rather low estimate, 
compared e.g. to the draft report by the finance ministers of the European Union (cf. Harrison 
2009b). The finance ministers estimate that annually €  100  billion (≈ $ 142 billion)  are 
needed from 2020 on to reduce emissions by 30 per cent below business as usual levels in 
the developing countries. Additional they conclude that € 20 to € 50 billion are necessary for 
adaptation measures (cf. Stabroek News 2009). Following some criteria on burden sharing 
the NGOs Oxfam Germany and BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany) argue that the devel-
oped countries should pay 75 per cent of the emission reductions in the developing countries 
or ca. € 70 billion (≈ $ 100 billion) annually (cf. Oxfam Germany, Friends of the Earth Ger-
many 2009, p. 8). They also demand that additionally and additional also to existing devel-
opment aid € 40 billion (≈ $ 57 billion) are needed annually for adaptation measures.  
Whether developed countries will commit themselves to such larges payments over several 
decades becomes especially questionable in times of the global economic and financial cri-
sis. Even the EU that always aims to show leadership in climate policy has postponed a 
decision on the funds they are willing to provide until October 2009. What is very illustrative 
in this context is to compare the green shares of the stimulus packages described in Sec-
tion  2 to the estimates of the EU and Oxfam. As described above of the altogether 
$ 2.7 trillion that have been earmarked globally for stimulus packages ca. 13.4 per cent or 
$ 361 billion are likely to go to climate friendly measures. Out of these ca. $ 160 billion origi-
nate from developed countries. Thus, with the help of the stimulus packages the developed 
countries managed to mobilize for on one-time the sum that has to be transferred to devel-
oping countries annually for several years. And not only is the money from the stimulus 
packages a one-time investment, it is also intended for measures in the national economies 
of developed countries while for an international climate treaty reoccurring expenditures for 
developing countries are needed.  
Concluding, mitigation of the effects of the global financial and economic crisis demands 
resources unimaginable before the crisis. As a result, it is doubtful whether world leaders will 
set ambitious targets for a post-Kyoto agreement in Copenhagen in December 2009, since   Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  12 / 15 
reaching ambitious targets entails costs that are likely to be beyond the current willingness to 
pay of both developed and developing countries. Still, the future costs of not coming to an 
agreement might go far beyond the negative effects of the global recession and even though 
the sums seem and are large, $ 160 billion is only 0.004 per cent of the annual GDP of the 
high income countries (in 2006 numbers) (cf. World Bank 2008).  
5.  Summary and Conclusions  
There is some danger that the current global financial and economic crisis will delay 
necessary climate policies worldwide even though the adverse effects of climate change are 
likely to be much more far reaching for the economic well-being, human development and 
prosperity than the current economic downturn. To avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate 
change (article  2 of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change) GHG emissions 
have to peak within the next few years and decline to about 50 per cent compared to 1990 
levels by mid-century. This requires that immediate action to decarbonise our societies is 
undertaken. This urgency does not vanish, because the global recession slows down 
emission growth for one or two years. Long term sustainable economic growth requires that 
we restructure our economies towards a more sustainable way of producing and consuming 
energy. There are a number of voices that call for increased climate action as an answer to 
the double crisis of economic recession and dangerous climate change.  
Indeed there are some signs that the crisis is increasing the national funds that are made 
available for climate protection. But there are also signs that the crisis is taken as an excuse 
to postpone necessary structural change and to fail to generate reasonable funding for 
climate mitigation and adaptation measures especially in the developing world.  
The positive signs are mainly the large economic stimulus packages of altogether 
$ 2.7 trillion or 4.7 per cent of global GDP that are allocated to remedy the global economic 
downturn by governments all around the world. Around 13 per cent or $ 361 billion of this 
money is spent for “climate friendly” investments which saves around 111 tonnes of CO2 
annually. Yet, this amount is less than 0.5 per cent of the actual global emissions. And not 
only is the share of 13 per cent for green measures only about half of the 25 per cent share 
that the UNEP proposed in its “Global Green New Deal”, also the measures that are financed 
with this money are not necessarily those that are most effective for quickly stimulating the 
economies and for saving emissions. These would be mainly improvements in energy effi-
ciency of public and private buildings and improvements in grid management. While for 
example the EU and the United States are at least investing large parts of their “green” funds 
into these measures, China mainly invests in the railway network capacity extension which 
saves relatively few emissions per dollar. Additionally, counterproductive measures like fuel 
subsidies or heating vouchers offset the saved emissions by “green” measures”. However, 
by earmarking the still “free” share of the stimulus packages for climate investment can 
significantly increase the amount of annually saved emissions.    Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  13 / 15 
Even in the best case though, the green funds cannot replace a long term sustainable 
climate policy. If we look at current national efforts, we will also get a mixed picture. There 
are at least some positive news even in times of global recession. For example China 
considers explicit emission targets for the first time, the EU passed its climate package that 
aims at reducing its GHG emissions by at least 20 per cent (compared to 1990) by 2020 and 
the United States are likely to agree on concrete reduction targets. Yet, there are also clear 
negative developments where climate policies have been postponed – such as the Australian 
emissions trading scheme – or watered down at least partially – such as the new rules for 
permit allocation in the EU emissions trading scheme and the US reduction targets. In 
Australia the global financial and economic crisis has served as an explicit argument for the 
delayed trading scheme, while in the other countries it is also likely that the crisis has 
increased the credibility of industry lobbying for less stringent policies.  
While national action including national funds for climate mitigation from the stimulus packa-
ges and national legislation is clearly important for reaching ambitious climate targets, the 
most important step is an agreement on a new international climate regime as a follow up of 
the Kyoto Protocol that expires in 2012. This agreement needs to include at least the major 
emitters also from the developing world. The Bali Action Plan from 2007 sets the path by 
asking for “measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commit-
ments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all 
developed country Parties” (cf. UNFCCC 2007). Yet it also states that “measurable, 
reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country 
Parties in the context of sustainable development” (cf. UNFCCC 2007) are necessary. 
Developed countries are responsible for the major share of past GHG emissions, have the 
highest per capita emissions and the highest welfare. Developing countries have low per 
capita emissions and suffer most from the adverse effects of climate change. Fairness 
requires that developed countries bear the largest burden of emission reductions and also 
partly pay for emission reductions in the developing countries. In this context an international 
climate fund has been proposed to which especially the developed countries should contrib-
ute and which will be used for climate protection and adaptation measures in developing 
countries. Representatives from developed as well as developing countries already signaled 
that such a fund could become a feasible solution in the negotiations and many experts 
stress the importance of large monetary transfers from developed to developing countries for 
an agreement. Estimates of the necessary size for such a fund vary. The EU estimates that 
annually ca. € 100 billion are necessary to sufficiently reduce emissions in developing coun-
tries. Additionally, ca. €  20 to €  50  billion are needed for adaptation measures. Approxi-
mately, this implies that the developed countries would have to annually transfer as many 
resources to developing countries as the green shares of their current stimulus packages. 
These are clearly large sums and there is the real danger that the global economic and 
financial crisis comes at the wrong time for the negotiations in Copenhagen in December 
2009.    Kiel  Policy  Brief  6  14 / 15 
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